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SCHAFFER ON THE ACTION OF THE WHOLE
ELIZABETH MILLER
I argue that Schaffer’s recent defence of Spinozan Monism—the thesis that
the cosmos is the only substance, or the only fundamental and integrated
thing—fails to establish that the universe is uniquely fundamental. In ad-
dition, Schaffer’s own defence of his thesis offers the pluralist about fun-
damentality a model for responding to Schaffer’s criticism of pluralism.
According to Jonathan Schaffer, the cosmos, the entire material uni-
verse, is the unique substance or ‘fundamental and integrated thing’
(2013, p. 68). Schaffer offers two arguments for this thesis of Spino-
zan Monism, both centring on the claim that the cosmos is a sub-
stance because it ‘evolves by the fundamental laws’ (p. 67), with
that condition understood in a very particular way: the behaviour of
the cosmos, the evolution of its intrinsic state, is always exactly as
the physical laws—or our fundamental theories expressing them—
predict. In both of Schaffer’s arguments for Spinozan Monism, a
thing’s evolving by the fundamental laws is sufficient to secure for it
the status of a substance. Schaffer’s primary argument also counts
evolution by the fundamental laws as necessary for substancehood,
incorporating as a premiss the biconditional Leibnizian Substance
(ls): ‘Something is a substance if and only if it evolves by the funda-
mental laws’ (p. 67).
On one reading, ls is unobjectionable but of limited interest: ls
expresses a particular, perhaps historically inspired, way of defining
‘substance’. It then turns out that the cosmos counts as the only sub-
stance in this sense—but it is not entirely clear what hangs on this
outcome. On the alternative reading, ls is not primarily concerned
with the definition or application of the honorific ‘substance’ but
with the identification of things that are metaphysically fundamen-
tal and unified in broad senses of clear importance to contemporary
metaphysics. Schaffer does seem to have quite broad senses in mind:
‘A thing is fundamental if and only if it depends on nothing further,
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and a thing is integrated if and only if it is not an arbitrary gerry-
mander but displays natural unity’ (Schaffer 2013, p. 68). ls then
connects a thing’s possession of these metaphysical features to its ev-
olution by the physical laws.
Even philosophers sympathetic to the idea that the metaphysically
fundamental things are those that somehow figure in the laws of
physics may quite understandably balk at the second, stronger, but
apparently faithful reading of ls, which precludes from counting as
a fundamental unity anything that is physically affected by—or
whose lawful evolution is physically dependent on—a distinct thing.
If ls is true, the only candidates for substances are entirely closed
physical systems. Since no proper part of the universe is a closed sys-
tem, no proper part of the universe is a substance. But it is far from
clear that metaphysical fundamentality and unity are, intuitively, so
strongly connected to physical isolation or independence.
There is a minor logical point that, when noted, might seem to
render Schaffer’s claim a bit more palatable. If we take ‘substance’
to be defined conjunctively as fundamental and integrated, as Schaf-
fer suggests, then both the truth of ls and the fact that the cosmos is
the only closed physical system are logically compatible with the ex-
istence of multiple fundamental but non-substantial things. This
might seem to recommend a weaker reading after all, a bit closer to
the honorific proposal: there is only one special substance, but there
still may be lots of things that are fundamental (or integrated, just
not both). Schaffer’s own position, however, appears to be a strong-
er. He says that ‘essentially … something is fundamental if and only
if this fundamental equation [expressing a fundamental law] applies
to it with full accuracy’ (2013, p. 68). He seems, then, to endorse
Leibnizian Fundamentality (lf): Something is fundamental if and
only if it evolves by the fundamental laws.
Since lf does not logically follow from ls, at least not without a
supplementary assumption that a thing is fundamental only if it is
integrated, Schaffer’s existing motivation and defence of ls does not
obviously suffice to establish the tight link that lf expresses be-
tween metaphysical fundamentality and evolution by the fundamen-
tal laws. For example, Schaffer responds to Leibnizian Substance,
Plural (lsp), a proposed pluralistic alternative to ls on which
‘[s]ome things are substances if and only if they co-evolve by the
fundamental laws’, by drawing only on considerations of integra-
tion, not fundamentality: but ‘Leibnizian Substance, Plural does not
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fit with the idea of substances as integrated. From the fact that some
things co-evolve by the fundamental laws, one can only infer that
this plurality acts as one. One cannot infer that any individual in
this plurality has the natural unity of a substance’ (Schaffer 2013,
p. 73) Because this criticism of lsp turns entirely on integration, it
fails to address the possibility that multiple co-evolving parts of the
cosmos might count as fundamental while still, perhaps, failing to
count as integrated substances in Schaffer’s sense.
Now, this point may seem to be mere hair-splitting, since the nat-
ural pluralistic counterpart to lf appears to be a non-starter. In fact,
we can quite straightforwardly adapt Schaffer’s criticism of lsp to
criticize the thesis Leibnizian Fundamentality, Plural (lfp), accord-
ing to which some things are fundamental if and only if they co-
evolve by the fundamental laws: Take ‘the plurality whose two
members are the sum of all left feet, and its mereological comple-
ment (the cosmos minus the sum of all left feet)’; since these togeth-
er compose the cosmos, they ‘collectively evolve by the fundamental
laws’. Even setting aside Schaffer’s primary concern that ‘they are
each mere heaps without natural unity’, the pluralist presumably
will not want to admit that they—or many of the other things that
together compose the cosmos—count as fundamental (2013, p. 73).
That is, the pluralist will not want to endorse lfp, even though it is,
prima facie, her natural alternative to lf.
The sensible pluralist move should be to say that co-evolution by
the fundamental laws is not sufficient for fundamentality, but, at best,
is necessary—perhaps it is still true that only things that (co-) evolve
by the fundamental laws are candidates to be fundamental. A worry,
though, is that such a revision to lfp is, or may appear to be, ad hoc.
Can someone antecedently sympathetic to the idea that metaphysical
fundamentality is closely tied to (co-)evolution by the fundamental
laws have some non-question-begging reason for making this revi-
sion? Can she say what she really wants to say, which is that there is a
single level of fundamental individuals that together compose the cos-
mos and that co-evolve according to the fundamental laws?
By Schaffer’s own lights, the answer should be ‘yes’. For one
thing, Schaffer’s second argument for Spinozan Monism relies on
the addition of the ‘Aristotelian Principle’ that ‘[n]o proper part of a
substance is a substance’, and one willing to grant this might very
naturally grant, too, that no proper part of a fundamental thing is
fundamental. In fact, Schaffer himself motivates his Aristotelian
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premiss with the claim that ‘substances are fundamental entities’
and so should be ‘open to free recombination’, which entails that
wholes and their parts, which are not open to free recombination,
should not (both) be counted as fundamental (2013, p. 83; see also
Schaffer 2010b). Thus Schaffer should grant that there is antecedent
motivation for restricting the set of fundamental things to a single
‘level’ of entities—in which case not all things that jointly compose
the cosmos need count as fundamental for the pluralist.
In addition, Schaffer takes ls to rest on a prior, modalized princi-
ple specifically phrased ‘to avoid overdetermination of fundamental
powers’—that is, to restrict fundamentality to a single level in the
way that the pluralist wishes (2013, p. 84). In fact, the pluralist can
herself retreat to a modalized principle, paralleling Schaffer’s own
move. Schaffer insists that, since ls is not a modalized claim, it does
not offer any guidance about other possible worlds. So, for instance,
endorsing ls does not force him to grant that another world of two
entirely closed physical systems contains three substances—each of
the systems plus their sum—and so parts equally fundamental to
their whole. However, he grants that there is a relevant modalized
metaphysical principle, Leibnizian Substance, Modalized, that ap-
plies to such a world and underlies ls’s applicability to our world: ‘It
is metaphysically necessary that something is a substance if and only
if it has an evolution governed by the fundamental laws’ (Schaffer
2013, p. 84). Crucially, ‘governing is always restricted to a single
mereological level’. He explains: ‘Leibnizian Substance encodes the
minimal condition of match between prediction and behaviour. This
minimal condition is sufficiently discriminating for worlds like ours
in which prediction and behaviour match at exactly one mereologi-
cal level, but needs strengthening in worlds like the two-monad
world in which prediction and behaviour match at multiple mereo-
logical levels, to discriminate the level of match reflecting the work-
ings (“governance”) of the fundamental laws from the level resulting
as a by-product’ (2013, p. 84). The governance restriction is meant
to address the very sort of worry that lfp raises for the pluralist. For
the pluralist, the match between prediction and co-evolving behav-
iour expressed by lfp is not sufficiently discriminating for our own
world. Our pluralist can offer an alternative, appropriately modal-
ized, metaphysical principle that parallels Schaffer’s: it is metaphysi-
cally necessary that some things are fundamental if and only if they
have a co-evolution governed by the fundamental laws.
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Once the pluralist restricts fundamentality to a single mereological
level at a world, she need not admit that all things that compose our
cosmos count as fundamental. She can say that co-evolution accord-
ing to the fundamental laws is, here, merely a necessary condition for
fundamentality—stating a necessary and sufficient condition re-
quires appeal to governing. And just as Leibnizian Substance, Mo-
dalized does not yet say which mereological level—whole or parts—
reflects the workings of the fundamental laws in a two-monad world
but leaves it as ‘a substantive matter’, our pluralist’s modalized prin-
ciple leaves open which level of cosmos-composing, co-evolving
things in our world counts as fundamental—and it does so in a way
that is well motivated in the dialectical context (2013, p. 84 n.24).
Elsewhere, Schaffer (2010a) offers independent arguments for the
conclusion that the cosmos is the single fundamental thing, as op-
posed to the only fundamental and integrated substance, and the
pluralist should evaluate these arguments on their own merits. The
main thing to note here is that Schaffer’s particular appeal to ls fails
to do the philosophical work that he takes it to do—it fails to rule
out the possibility of a fundamental plurality and so fails to establish
the cosmos as a unique fundamental substance.1 For notice that a
particularly conciliatory pluralist can simply grant ls. She can agree
that something is a substance—something is both fundamental and
integrated—in Schaffer’s sense if and only if it evolves by the funda-
mental laws, and she also can grant that the cosmos is the only rele-
vantly integrated candidate for a substance, so defined, in our world.
However, she will also go on to deny that anything in our world is, in
fact, a substance in Schaffer’s sense, since she will deny that the cos-
mos is one among her many fundamental things—fundamentality,
after all, is to be restricted to a single mereological level.
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1 This result is perhaps particularly worrying for Schaffer in light of his expressed scepticism
concerning the utility of the metaphysical category of substance and preference for the
notion of (fundamental) thing (2013, p. 81).
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